l motion. This
doctrine, of course, denies the spirituality of the Divine Being, as well
as of all created souls, and strikes a fatal blow at the immutability of
moral distinctions. It is unnecessary to say, that in such a sense of the
word, neither Calvin nor Luther can be justly accused of fatalism; as it
is well known that both of them maintained the spirituality of God, as
well as the reality of moral distinctions prior to all human laws.
The second scheme of fatalism rises above the first in point of dignity
and purity of character. It proceeds on the idea that all things in heaven
and earth are bound together by "an implexed series and concatenation of
causes:" it admits the existence of God, it is true, but yet it regards
him as merely the greatest and brightest link in the adamantine universal
chain of necessity. According to this scheme, as well as to the former,
the very idea of moral liberty is inconceivable and impossible. This
portentous scheme was perfectly understood and expressly repudiated by
Calvin. In reference to this doctrine, which was maintained by the ancient
Stoics, he says: "That dogma is falsely and maliciously charged upon us.
For we do not, with the Stoics, imagine a necessity arising from a
perpetual concatenation and intricate series of causes contained in
nature; but we make God the Arbiter and Governor of all things, who, in
his own wisdom, has, from all eternity, decreed what he would do, and now
by his own power executes what he decreed."
Here we behold the nature of the third scheme, which has been included
under the term _fatalism_. It recognises God as the great central and
all-controlling power of the universe. It does not deny the possibility of
liberty; for it recognises its actual existence in the Divine Being. "If
the divine will," says Calvin, "has any cause, then there must be
something antecedent, on which it depends; which it is impious to
suppose." According to Calvin, it is the uncaused divine will which makes
the "necessity of all things." He frequently sets forth the doctrine,
that, from all eternity, God decreed whatever should come to pass, not
excepting, but expressly including, the deliberations and "volitions of
men," and by his own power now executes his decree. As we do not wish to
use opprobrious names, we shall characterize these three several schemes
of doctrine by the appellations given to them by their advocates. The
first we shall call, "materialistic fat
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