alism;" the second, "Stoical
fatalism;" and the third we shall designate by the term, "_necessity_."

Widely as these schemes may differ in other respects, they have one
feature in common: they all seem to bear with equal stringency on the
human will, and deprive it of that freedom which is now conceded to be
indispensable to render men accountable for their actions. If our
volitions be produced by a series of causes, according to the Stoical
notion of fate, or by the omnipotence of God, they would seem to be
equally necessitated and devoid of freedom. Hence, in attacking one of
these schemes at this point, we really attack them all. We shall first
consider the question, then, How does Calvin attempt to reconcile his
doctrine with the accountability of man? How does he show, for example,
that the first man was guilty and justly punishable for a transgression in
which he succumbed to the divine omnipotence?

If a man is really laid under a necessity of sinning, it would certainly
seem impossible to conceive that he is responsible for his sins. Nay, it
would not only seem impossible to conceive this, but it would also appear
very easy to understand, that he could not be responsible for them. In
order to remove this difficulty, and repel the attack of his opponents,
Calvin makes a distinction between "co-action and necessity." "Now, when I
assert," says he, "that the will, being deprived of its liberty, is
necessarily drawn or led into evil, I should wonder if any one considered
it as a harsh expression, since it has nothing in it absurd, nor is it
unsanctioned by the custom of good men. It offends those who know not how
to distinguish between necessity and compulsion."(2) Let us see, then,
what is this distinction between necessity and compulsion, or co-action,
(as Calvin sometimes calls it,) which is to take off all appearance of
harshness from his views. We are not to imagine that this is a distinction
without a difference; for, in truth, there is no distinction in philosophy
which may be more easily made, or more clearly apprehended. It is this:
Suppose a man wills a particular thing, or external action, and it is
prevented from happening by any outward restraint; or suppose he is
unwilling to do a thing, and he is constrained to do it against his will;
he is said to labour under compulsion or co-action. Of course he is not
accountable for the failure of the consequence of his will in the one
case, nor for the conseque