as he pleases_. Or, in other words, his being free from
hinderance or impediment in the way of doing or conducting in any respect
_as he wills_. And the contrary to liberty, whatever name we call it by,
is a person being hindered, or unable to conduct as he will, or being
necessitated to do otherwise." Here, it will be seen, that liberty,
according to this notion of it, has no relation to the manner in which the
will arises, or comes into existence; if one's external conduct can only
follow his will, he is free.

"There are two things," says he, "contrary to what is called liberty in
common speech. One is _constraint_, otherwise called _force_,
_compulsion_, and _co-action_; which is a person being necessitated to do
a thing _contrary_ to his will. The other is _restraint_; which is, his
being hindered, and not having power to do _according_ to his will. But
that which has no will cannot be the subject of these things." This
definition, it is plain, presupposes the existence of a volition; and
liberty consists in the absence of co-action. It has no relation to the
question as to how we come by our volitions, whether they are put forth by
the mind itself without being necessitated, or whether they are
necessarily produced in us. It leaves this great fundamental question
untouched.

On this subject his language is perfectly explicit. There is nothing in
Kames, nor Collins, nor Crombie, nor Hobbes, nor any other writer, more
perfectly unequivocal. "But one thing more," says he, "I would observe
concerning what is vulgarly called liberty, namely, that power and
opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will, or according to his
choice, is all that is meant by it, without taking into the meaning of the
word anything of the cause of that choice, or at all considering how the
person came to have such a volition, or internal habit and bias; whether
it was determined by some internal antecedent volition, or whether it
happened without a cause; whether it were necessarily connected with
something foregoing, or not connected. _Let the person come by his choice
any how_, yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder
his pursuing and executing his will, _the man is perfectly free according
to the primary and common notion of freedom_." Now this is all the
definition of liberty with which his "Inquiry" furnishes us; and this, he
says, is "sufficient to show what is meant by liberty, according to the
common notion