me in question, the mind does not act upon the body,
nor the body upon the mind; for there is no power, and consequently no
action of power, in the universe. Now, it is known that it was the
doctrine of Leibnitz, that two substances so wholly unlike as mind and
matter could not act upon each other; and hence he concluded that the
phenomena of the internal and external worlds were merely "_conjoined_,
not _connected_." The soul and body run together--to use his own
illustration--like two independent watches, without either exerting any
influence upon the movements of the other. Thus arose his celebrated, but
now obsolete fiction, of a preestablished harmony. Now, if the doctrine of
Hume and Brown be true, this sort of harmony subsists, not only in
relation to mind and body, but in relation to all things in existence.
Mind never acts upon body, nor mind upon mind. Hence, this doctrine is but
a generalization of the preestablished harmony of Leibnitz, with the
exception that Mr. Hume did not contend that this wonderful harmony was
established by the Divine Being. Is it not wonderful that so acute a
metaphysician as Dr. Brown should not have perceived the inseparable
affinity between his doctrine and that of Leibnitz? Is it not wonderful
that, instead of perceiving this affinity, he should have poured ridicule
and contempt upon the doctrine of which his own was but a generalization?
Mr. Mill, another able and strenuous advocate of Mr. Hume's theory of
causation, has likewise ranked the preestablished harmony of Leibnitz, as
well as the system of occasional causes peculiar to Malebranche, among the
fallacies of the human mind. Thus they are at war with themselves, as well
as with their great coadjutors in the cause of necessity.

M. Comte, preeminently distinguished in every branch of science, has taken
the same one-sided view of nature as that which is exhibited in the theory
under consideration; but he does not permit himself to be encumbered by
the inconsistencies observable in his great predecessors. On the contrary,
he boldly carries out his doctrine to its legitimate consequences, denying
the existence of a God, the free-agency of man, and the reality of moral
distinctions.

Mr. Mill also refuses to avail himself of the notion of liberty
entertained by Hobbes and Hume, in order to lay a foundation for human
responsibility. He sees that it really cannot be made to answer such a
purpose. He also sees, that the doctrine o