language of Sir William Hamilton, he "did not anatomize, but
truncate."
If this doctrine be true, it is idle to talk about free-agency, for there
is no such thing as agency in the world. It is true, there is a thing
which we call volition, or an act of the mind; but this does not produce
the external change by which it is followed. The two events co-exist, but
there is no connecting tie between them. "They are _conjoined_, but not
connected." In short, according to this scheme, all things are equally
free, and all equally necessary. In other words, there is neither freedom
nor necessity in the usual acceptation of the terms; and the whole
controversy concerning them, which has agitated the learned for so many
ages, dwindles down into a mere empty and noisy logomachy. Indeed, this is
the conclusion to which Mr. Hume himself comes; expressly maintaining that
the controversy in question has been a dispute about words. We are not to
suppose from this, however, that he forbears to give a definition of
liberty. His idea of free-agency is precisely that of Hobbes, and so many
others before him. "By liberty," says he, "we can only mean a power of
_acting or not acting according to the determination of the will_: that
is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also
may."(46) Such he declares is all that can possibly be meant by the term
_liberty_; and hence it follows that any other idea of it is a mere dream.
The coolness of this assumption is admirable; but it is fully equalled by
the conclusion which follows. If we will observe these two circumstances,
says he, and thereby render our definition intelligible, Mr. Hume is
perfectly persuaded "that all mankind will be found of one opinion with
regard to it." If Mr. Hume had closely looked into the great productions
of his own school, he would have seen the utter improbability, that
necessitarians themselves would ever concur in such a notion of
liberty.(47)
If Mr. Hume's scheme were correct, it would seem that nothing could be
stable or fixed; mind would be destitute of energy to move within its own
sphere, or to bind matter in its orbit. All things would seem to be in a
loose, disconnected, and fluctuating state. But this is not the view which
he had of the matter. Though he denied that there is any connecting link
among events, yet he insisted that the connexion subsisting among them is
fixed and unalterable. "Let any one define a cause," says he, "
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