ty of a moral agent, and
reduce him to a passive machine." Now, how does the historian so easily
demonstrate that the doctrine of necessity, as held by the reformers, does
not deny the liberty of a moral agent? Why, by simply producing the old
effete notion of the liberty of the will, as consisting in freedom from
co-action; as if it had never been, and never could be, called in
question. "Every action performed without external restraint," says he,
"and in pursuance of the determination of the soul itself, is a free
action."(34) This demonstration, it is needless to repeat, would save any
scheme of fatalism from reproach, as well as the doctrine of the
reformers.
The scheme of the Calvinists is defended in the same manner in Hill's
Divinity: "The liberty of a moral agent," says he, "consists in the power
of acting according to his choice; and those actions are free, which are
performed without any external compulsion or restraint, in consequence of
the determination of his own mind." "According to the Calvinists," says
Mr. Shaw, in his Exposition of the Confession of Faith, "the liberty of a
moral agent consists in the power of acting according to his choice; and
those actions are free which are performed without any external compulsion
or restraint, in consequence of the determination of his own mind."(35)
Such, if we may believe these learned Calvinists, is the idea of the
freedom of the will which belongs to their system. If this be so, then it
must be conceded that the Calvinistic definition of the freedom of the
will is perfectly consistent with the most absolute scheme of fatality
which ever entered into the heart of man to conceive.
The views of M'Cosh respecting the freedom of the will, seem, at first
sight, widely different from those of other Calvinists and necessitarians.
The freedom and independence of the will is certainly pushed as far by him
as it is carried by Cousin, Coleridge, Clarke, or any of its advocates in
modern times. "True necessitarians," says he, "should learn in what way to
hold and defend their doctrine. Let them disencumber themselves of all
that doubtful argument, derived from man being supposed to be swayed by
the most powerful motive."(36) Again: "The truth is," says he, "it is not
motive, properly speaking, that determines the working of the will; but it
is the will that imparts the strength to the motive. As Coleridge says,
'It is the man that makes the motive, and not the motive t
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