l times," says he, "have
been troubled by a sophism, which the ancients called the '_raison
paresseuse_,' because it induces them to do nothing, or at least to
concern themselves about nothing, and to follow only the present
inclination to pleasure. For, say they, if the future is necessary, that
which is to happen will happen whatever I may do. But the future, say
they, is necessary, either because the Divinity foresees all things, and
even preestablishes them in governing the universe; or because all things
necessarily come to pass by a concatenation of causes."(23) Leibnitz
illustrated the fallacy of this reasoning in the following manner: "By the
same reason (if it is valid) I could say--If it is written in the archives
of fate, that poison will kill me at present, or do me harm, this will
happen, though I should not take it; and if that is not written, it will
not happen, though I should take it; and, consequently, I can follow my
inclination to take whatever is agreeable with impunity, however
pernicious it may be; which involves a manifest absurdity.... This
objection staggers them a little, but they always come back to their
reasoning, turned in different points of view, until we cause them to
comprehend in what the defect of their sophism consists. It is this, that
it is false that the event will happen whatever we may do; it will happen,
because we do that which leads to it; and if the event is written, the
cause which will make it happen is also written. Thus the connexion
(_liaison_) of effects and their causes, so far from establishing the
doctrine of a necessity prejudicial to practice, serves to destroy
it."(24) The same reply is found more than once in the course of the same
great work; and it is employed by all necessitarians in defence of their
system. But it is not a satisfactory answer. It overlooks the real
difficulty in the case, and seeks to remove an imaginary one. The question
is, not whether a necessary connexion between our volitions and their
_effects_ is a discouragement to practice, but whether a necessary
connexion between our volitions and their _causes_ is so. It is very true,
that no man would be accountable for his external actions or their
consequences, if there were no fixed relation between these and his
volitions. If, when a man willed one thing, another should happen to
follow which he did not will, of course he would not be responsible for
it. And if there were no certain or fixed
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