an
accountable agent, he must be free, not only from constraint, but also
from necessity. In the adoption of this language, Leibnitz seems to speak
with the advocates of free-agency; but does he think with them? The sound
is pleasant to the ear; but what sense is it intended to convey to the
mind? Leibnitz shall be his own interpreter. "All events have their
necessary causes," says Hobbes. "Bad," replies Leibnitz: "they have their
_determining_ causes, by which we can assign a reason for them; but they
have not necessary causes." Now does this signify that an event, that a
volition, is not absolutely and indissolubly connected with its
"determining cause?" Is this the grand idea from which the light of
liberty is to beam on a darkened and enslaved world? By no means. We must
indulge no fond hopes or idle dreams of the kind. Volition is free from
necessity, adds Leibnitz; because "_the contrary could happen without
implying a contradiction_." This is the signification which he attaches to
his own language; and it is the only meaning of which it is susceptible in
accordance with his system. Thus, Leibnitz saw and clearly exposed the
futility of speaking about a freedom from co-action or restraint, when the
question is, not whether the body is untrammelled, but whether the mind
itself is free in the act of willing. But he did not see, it seems, that
it is equally irrelevant to speak of a freedom from a mathematical
necessity in such a connexion; although this, as plainly as the other
sense of the word, has no conceivable bearing on the point in dispute. If
a volition were produced by the omnipotence of God, irresistibly acting on
the human mind, still it would not be necessary, in the sense of Leibnitz,
since it might and would have been different if God had so willed it; the
contrary volition implying no contradiction. Is it not evident, that to
suppose the mind may thus be bound to act, and yet be free because the
contrary act implies no contradiction, is merely to dream of liberty, and
to mistake a shadow for a substance?

As the opposite of a volition implies no contradiction, says Leibnitz, so
it is free from an absolute necessity; that is to say, it might have been
different, nay, it must have been different, from what it is, provided its
determining cause had been different. The same thing may be said of the
motions of matter. We may say that they are also free, because the
opposite motions imply no contradiction; an