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of a free agent, I confess," says he, "is not that represented by Mr.
Hobbes, namely, one that when all things necessary to produce the effect
are present, can nevertheless not produce it; but I believe a free-agent
of whatever kind is one which, where all things necessary to produce the
effect are present, can produce it; its own operation not being hindered
by anything else. The body is said to be free when it has the power to
obey the direction of the will; so the will may be said to be free when it
has the power to obey the dictates of the understanding."(11) Thus the
liberty of the will is made to consist not in the denial that its
volitions are produced, but in the absence of impediments which might
hinder its operations from taking effect. This idea of liberty, it is
evident, is perfectly consistent with the materialistic fatalism of
Hobbes, which is so much admired by Mr. Hazlitt.
Section III.
The sentiments of Descartes, Spinoza, and Malebranche, concerning the
relation between liberty and necessity.
No one was ever more deeply implicated in the scheme of necessity than
Descartes. "Mere philosophy," says he, "is enough to make us know that
there cannot enter the least thought into the mind of man, but God must
will and have willed from all eternity that it should enter there." His
argument in proof of this position is short and intelligible. "God," says
he, "could not be absolutely perfect if there could happen anything in
this world which did not spring entirely from him." Hence it follows, that
it is inconsistent with the absolute perfections of God to suppose that a
being created by him could put forth a volition which does not spring
entirely from him, and not even in part from the creature.
Yet Descartes is a warm believer in the doctrine of free-will. On the
ground of reason, he believes in an absolute predestination of all things;
and yet he concludes from experience that man is free. If we ask how these
things can hang together, he replies, that we cannot tell; that a solution
of this difficulty lies beyond the reach of the human faculties. Now, it
is evident, that reason cannot "make us know" one thing, and experience
teach another, quite contrary to it; for no two truths can ever contradict
each other. Those who adopt this mode of viewing the subject, generally
remind us of the feebleness of human reason, and of the necessary limits
to all human speculat
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