lease,' viz. of the reasoning from this very
fault of ill-foundedness. The true nature of the cause of the world on
which final emancipation depends cannot, on account of its excessive
abstruseness, even be thought of without the help of the holy texts;
for, as already remarked, it cannot become the object of perception,
because it does not possess qualities such as form and the like, and as
it is devoid of characteristic signs, it does not lend itself to
inference and the other means of right knowledge.--Or else (if we adopt
another explanation of the word 'avimoksha') all those who teach the
final release of the soul are agreed that it results from perfect
knowledge. Perfect knowledge has the characteristic mark of uniformity,
because it depends on accomplished actually existing things; for
whatever thing is permanently of one and the same nature is acknowledged
to be a true or real thing, and knowledge conversant about such is
called perfect knowledge; as, for instance, the knowledge embodied in
the proposition, 'fire is hot.' Now, it is clear that in the case of
perfect knowledge a mutual conflict of men's opinions is impossible. But
that cognitions founded on reasoning do conflict is generally known; for
we continually observe that what one logician endeavours to establish as
perfect knowledge is demolished by another, who, in his turn, is treated
alike by a third. How therefore can knowledge, which is founded on
reasoning, and whose object is not something permanently uniform, be
perfect knowledge?--Nor can it be said that he who maintains the
pradhana to be the cause of the world (i.e. the Sa@nkhya) is the best of
all reasoners, and accepted as such by all philosophers; which would
enable us to accept his opinion as perfect knowledge.--Nor can we
collect at a given moment and on a given spot all the logicians of the
past, present, and future time, so as to settle (by their agreement)
that their opinion regarding some uniform object is to be considered
perfect knowledge. The Veda, on the other hand, which is eternal and the
source of knowledge, may be allowed to have for its object firmly
established things, and hence the perfection of that knowledge which is
founded on the Veda cannot be denied by any of the logicians of the
past, present, or future. We have thus established the perfection of
this our knowledge which reposes on the Upanishads, and as apart from it
perfect knowledge is impossible, its disregard woul
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