a@nkhya is equally driven to the doctrine that
before the actual beginning the effect was non-existent. And, moreover,
it being admitted (by the Sa@nkhya also) that at the time of
reabsorption the effect passes back into the state of non-distinction
from the cause, the case of the Sa@nkhya here also is the same as
ours.--And, further, if (as the Sa@nkhya also must admit) at the time of
reabsorption the differences of all the special effects are obliterated
and pass into a state of general non-distinction, the special fixed
conditions, which previous to reabsorption were the causes of the
different worldly existence of each soul, can, at the time of a new
creation, no longer be determined, there being no cause for them; and if
you assume them to be determined without a cause, you are driven to the
admission that even the released souls have to re-enter a state of
bondage, there being equal absence of a cause (in the case of the
released and the non-released souls). And if you try to avoid this
conclusion by assuming that at the time of reabsorption some individual
differences pass into the state of non-distinction, others not, we reply
that in that case the latter could not be considered as effects of the
pradhana[273].--It thus appears that all those difficulties (raised by
the Sa@nkhya) apply to both views, and cannot therefore be urged against
either only. But as either of the two doctrines must necessarily be
accepted, we are strengthened--by the outcome of the above
discussion--in the opinion that the alleged difficulties are no real
difficulties[274].

11. If it be said that, in consequence of the ill-foundedness of
reasoning, we must frame our conclusions otherwise; (we reply that) thus
also there would result non-release.

In matters to be known from Scripture mere reasoning is not to be relied
on for the following reason also. As the thoughts of man are altogether
unfettered, reasoning which disregards the holy texts and rests on
individual opinion only has no proper foundation. We see how arguments,
which some clever men had excogitated with great pains, are shown, by
people still more ingenious, to be fallacious, and how the arguments of
the latter again are refuted in their turn by other men; so that, on
account of the diversity of men's opinions, it is impossible to accept
mere reasoning as having a sure foundation. Nor can we get over this
difficulty by accepting as well-founded the reasoning of some perso