ndisement or empire but an equal fellowship with other great
nations, if we desire to contribute to the progress of international
development and not merely get all we can in the scramble, how shall we
shape our foreign policy? On what broad general principle shall we
decide the urgent questions which arise day by day in most unexpected
conjunctions?

The answer to these questions is not easy; there is not even an
agreement as to what our interests are. What, after all, do the
hundred million Americans want beyond their borders? What are we
willing to fight for rather than forego? What do we already have or
claim, the retention of which would justify us in fighting?

How we shall answer this depends upon our temperament and our special
interests. Certain Americans would advise us to fight all Europe,
rather than recede from an action already determined upon or
acknowledge that American policy is conditioned by the will of
foreigners. One need not argue against such convictions. It is the
current, instinctive philosophy of "My country right or wrong, wise or
foolish; my country against the world." To fight {205} all Europe,
however, is not to fight at all, but merely to be assassinated. To act
as though Europe had no rights which America needs respect is to adopt
a principle profoundly hostile to our own welfare.

To a financier, whose interests in Mexico, Guatemala or Indo-China are
attacked, war seems preferable to a neglect of those interests. He
would not put the matter so crudely; he would say that he preferred
defeat or even disaster to a peace dictated by fear. What would lead
him to this patriotic conclusion, however, would be the conviction that
to do nothing would lose him his property, whereas even a disastrous
war would cost him only his share in the national loss. And the war
might be gained or even avoided, if only the United States were bold
enough. He would, therefore, define our national interests as
including all those things to which we in our good judgment believed
that we had some claim.

Those with no special interest in foreign investments are less
solicitous. A default on the bonds of Mexican railways is less costly
to the Iowa farmer or Boston stonemason than the contraction of debts
for the purpose of pacifying Mexico. To fight England or Germany seems
more costly to the average American than to forego extra opportunities
for making money in China or the Argentine. Even the f