crisis of a group of
nations possessing a preponderance of world power.
Our relations with Canada present fewer temptations. Our policy should
look towards the creation of friendly relations and a nearer economic
union, but neither immediately nor ultimately towards a forced
annexation. A willing political incorporation of Canada into the
United States might be excellent, but an annexation against the
opposition of the Canadian people would be a crime and blunder. It
would mean an American Alsace-Lorraine upon an immense scale.
Economically Canada and the United States are rapidly becoming one.
With exports to {213} Canada already more than twice as great as those
of all other nations (including Great Britain) we can at will draw upon
her immense agricultural and mineral resources by the simple expedient
of letting down our tariff wall. We can invest there as safely as
Britisher or Canadian, and can benefit by Canada (as Canada benefits by
us) as though she were a part of the United States. A growth of the
eight million Canadians to twenty or more millions will mean for us an
enhanced prosperity. Despite absurd prejudices on both sides of the
border the economic union grows stronger.[4]
If we do not strive for an inside track in Latin America nor for the
conquest of Canada, should we be willing to fight for the "open door"
in China, for equal privileges in all parts of that Empire?
The phrase the "open door" has a pleasing sound. There can be no doubt
that the opening up of China's ports to commerce with all nations on
equal terms would be of immediate advantage to us, and probably to
China herself. Our interest in the matter, however, is frankly
selfish. Though we have a kindly feeling for the Chinese, so long as
they stay in China, our "open door" policy is intended in the first
instance to benefit our own merchants and investors. The alternative
to the open door is to {214} permit other nations to divide up China, a
proceeding in which we do not care to take part, and to exclude us from
certain trade and investment opportunities.
It is doubtful whether these chances which we should lose by an
unaggressive policy, are sufficiently important to justify us in
entering upon a conflict with Japan or with Japan and Russia.[5] Our
losses would be less than is imagined, for whoever opens up China will
be compelled to admit other industrial nations upon reasonable terms.
Japan cannot finance herself, to say
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