nded in a deadlock and the two groups of powers, unwilling
to trust each other, were to confide Constantinople and the straits to
the keeping of the United States, it would be almost unthinkable that
we should be false to the trust. We should have no interest in
favouring one group of nations as against the other; we should have no
political axe to grind and no economic or territorial gains to make.
We should be fair and disinterested because we had no interest.

{202}

Our recent attitude toward Cuba, the Philippines and Mexico has been
relatively disinterested in the second sense. We might have made money
by exploiting these countries. We could have held Cuba; we might have
imported a million Chinese into the Philippine Islands and grown rich
on their toil, while in Mexico, where we already had invested a large
capital which was menaced and in part destroyed by the revolution, we
could have taken what we wanted and held what we took. Certain motives
of decency prevented us from following this ruthless course; our
self-satisfaction was worth more to us than a few hundred million
dollars. The important fact, however, was that we were not pressed for
this wealth. We were not compelled by poverty or pressure of
population to grab what we could. We were able to seek a larger
interest, to lay the basis of a slower but surer prosperity and to gain
the good will, if not of Cubans, Filipinos and Mexicans, at least of
the nations generally. In the long run it was a policy that will pay,
and our conditions are such that we can still afford to consider the
long run.

But although we have been occasionally disinterested or have shown at
least a chemical trace of disinterestedness, our foreign policy has
usually pursued concrete national aims. It has been a conservative,
relatively uneventful policy, consisting for the most part in a quiet,
unhurried advancement of our interests, with a not excessive
consideration for the opinions of other nations. We have been cautious
though persistent. We have avoided forcing quarrels upon powerful
nations until we had grown irresistible. Usually we obtained the large
thing, but where we could obtain it only by fighting formidable
opponents, we compromised. When as in 1861 we found ourselves in a
dangerous position, we endured aggression by France and Spain until we
were again free {203} to compel redress. Time worked for us, the
passing years were our allies and we could afford