th the part cut off. Yet in spite of this disappearance
Nelson certainly doubled at the Nile, and according to Captain Edward
Berry, who was captain of his flagship, he did it deliberately. 'It is
almost unnecessary,' he wrote in his narrative, 'to explain his
projected mode of attack at anchor, as that was minutely and precisely
executed in the action.... These plans however were formed two months
before, ... and the advantage now was that they were familiar to the
understanding of every captain in the fleet.' Nelson probably felt
that the dangers attending doubling in an action under sail are
scarcely appreciable in an action at anchor with captains whose
steadiness he could trust. Still Saumarez, his second in command,
regarded it as a mistake, and there was a good deal of complaint of
our ships having suffered from each other's fire.[7]

Amongst the more important retentions of tactical signals we find that
for Hoste's method of giving battle to a numerically superior force by
leaving gaps in your own line between van, centre and rear. The
wording however is changed. It is no longer enjoined as a means of
avoiding being doubled. As Howe inserted it in MS. the signification
now ran 'for the van or particular divisions to engage the headmost of
the enemy's van, the rear the sternmost of the enemy's rear, and the
centre the centre of the enemy. But with exception of the flag
officers of the fleet who should engage those of the enemy
respectively in preference.'[8] This signification again is
considerably modified by the Explanatory Instructions. Article XXIV.,
it will be seen, says nothing of engaging the centre or of leaving
regular gaps. The leading ship is to engage the enemy's leading ship,
and the rearmost the rearmost, while the rest are to select the
largest ships they can get at, and leave the weaker ones alone till
the stronger are disabled. It was in effect the adoption of Hoste's
fifth rule for engaging a numerically superior fleet instead of his
first, and it is a plan which he condemns except in the case of your
being individually superior to your enemy, as indeed the English
gunnery usually made them.

The curious signal No. 218 of 1782 for attacking the enemy's rear in
succession by 'defiling' on the Elizabethan plan was also retained. In
the Signal Book of 1799 it ran, 'to fire in succession upon the
sternmost ships of the enemy, then tack or wear and take station in
rear of the squadron or division s