visit to the admiralty, after Howe had succeeded Keppel at the end of
1783, Knowles brought with him by request a tactical treatise written
by his father, as well as certain of his own tactical studies, and
discussed with Howe a certain manoeuvre which he believed the French
employed for avoiding decisive actions. He showed that when engaged to
leeward they fell off by alternate ships as soon as they were hard
pressed, and kept reforming their line to leeward, so that the British
had continually to bear up, and expose themselves to be raked aloft in
order to close again. In this way, as he pointed out, the French were
always able to clip the British wings without receiving any decisive
injury themselves. In a MS. note to his 'Fighting and Sailing
Instructions,' he puts the matter quite clearly. 'In the battle off
Granada,' he says, 'in the year 1779 the French ships partially
executed this manoeuvre, and Sir Charles [H.] Knowles (then 5th
lieutenant of the Prince of Wales of 74 guns, the flagship of the
Hon. Admiral Barrington) drew this manoeuvre, and which he showed
Admiral Lord Howe, when first lord of the admiralty, during the
peace. His lordship established a signal to break through the enemy's
line and engage on the other side to leeward, and which he executed
himself in the battle of the 1st of June, 1794.' The note adds that
before Knowles drew Howe's attention to the supposed French manoeuvre
he had been content with his original Article XIV., modifying Article
XXI. of the old Fighting Instructions as already explained. Whether
therefore Knowles's account is precisely accurate or not, we may take
it as certain that it was to baffle the French practice of avoiding
close action by falling away to leeward that Howe hit on his brilliant
conception of breaking through their line in all parts.

No finer manoeuvre was ever designed. In the first place it developed
the utmost fire-face by bringing both broadsides into play. Secondly,
by breaking up the enemy's line into fragments it deprived their
admiral of any shadow of control over the part attacked. Thirdly, by
seizing the leeward position (the essential postulate of the French
method of fighting) it prevented individual captains making good their
escape independently to leeward and ensured a decisive _melee_,
such as Nelson aimed at. And, fourthly, it permitted a concentration
on any part of the enemy's line, since it actually severed it at any
desired point quit