al
results to the civil population of Khartoum. Had Gordon reached there
early in January he could have saved them all, for as it was he sent
down 2600 refugees, i.e. merchants, old men, women, and children,
making all arrangements for their comfort in the very brief period of
open communication after his arrival, when the greater part of
February had been spent.

The conviction that Gordon's appointment and departure were retarded
by personal _animus_ and an old difference is certainly strengthened
by all that follows. Sir Evelyn Baring and the Egyptian Government
would not have Charles Gordon, but they were quite content to entrust
the part of Saviour of the Soudan to Zebehr, the king of the
slave-hunters. On 13th December Lord Granville curtly informed our
representative at Cairo that the employment of Zebehr was inexpedient,
and Gordon in his own forcible way summed the matter up thus: "Zebehr
will manage to get taken prisoner, and will then head the revolt."

But while Sir Evelyn Baring would not have Gordon and the British
Cabinet withheld its approval from Zebehr, it was felt that the
situation required that something should be done as soon as possible,
for the Mahdi was master of the Soudan, and at any moment tidings
might come of his advance on Khartoum, where there was only a small
and disheartened garrison, and a considerable defenceless population.
The responsible Egyptian Ministers made several suggestions for
dealing with the situation, but they one and all deprecated ceding
territory to the Mahdi, as it would further alienate the tribes still
loyal or wavering and create graver trouble in the future. What they
chiefly contended for was the opening of the Berber-Souakim route with
10,000 troops, who should be Turks, as English troops were not
available. It is important to note that this suggestion did not shock
the Liberal Government, and on 13th December 1883 Lord Granville
replied that the Government had no objection to offer to the
employment of Turkish troops at Souakim for service in the Soudan. In
the following month the Foreign Secretary went one step further, and
"concurred in the surrender of the Soudan to the Sultan." In fact the
British Government were only anxious about one thing, and that was to
get rid of the Soudan, and to be saved any further worry in the
matter. No doubt, if the Sultan had had the money to pay for the
despatch of the expedition, this last suggestion would have been
adop