ficiently strong
and forcible. But when society has become numerous, and has encreased to
a tribe or nation, this interest is more remote; nor do men so readily
perceive, that disorder and confusion follow upon every breach of these
rules, as in a more narrow and contracted society. But though in our own
actions we may frequently lose sight of that interest, which we have in
maintaining order, and may follow a lesser and more present interest,
we never fail to observe the prejudice we receive, either mediately or
immediately, from the injustice of others; as not being in that case
either blinded by passion, or byassed by any contrary temptation.
Nay when the injustice is so distant from us, as no way to affect our
interest, it still displeases us; because we consider it as prejudicial
to human society, and pernicious to every one that approaches the person
guilty of it. We partake of their uneasiness by sympathy; and as every
thing, which gives uneasiness in human actions, upon the general survey,
is called Vice, and whatever produces satisfaction, in the same manner,
is denominated Virtue; this is the reason why the sense of moral good
and evil follows upon justice and injustice. And though this sense,
in the present case, be derived only from contemplating the actions
of others, yet we fail not to extend it even to our own actions. The
general rule reaches beyond those instances, from which it arose; while
at the same time we naturally sympathize with others in the sentiments
they entertain of us. Thus self-interest is the original motive to the
establishment of justice: but a sympathy with public interest is the
source of the moral approbation, which attends that virtue.

Though this progress of the sentiments be natural, and even necessary,
it is certain, that it is here forwarded by the artifice of politicians,
who, in order to govern men more easily, and preserve peace in human
society, have endeavoured to produce an esteem for justice, and an
abhorrence of injustice. This, no doubt, must have its effect; but
nothing can be more evident, than that the matter has been carryed too
far by certain writers on morals, who seem to have employed their
utmost efforts to extirpate all sense of virtue from among mankind.
Any artifice of politicians may assist nature in the producing of those
sentiments, which she suggests to us, and may even on some occasions,
produce alone an approbation or esteem for any particular action;