to violate the
property of others. I only maintain, that there was no such thing
as property; and consequently coued be no such thing as justice or
injustice. I shall have occasion to make a similar reflection with
regard to promises, when I come to treat of them; and I hope this
reflection, when duly weighed, will suffice to remove all odium from the
foregoing opinions, with regard to justice and injustice.
SECT. III OF THE RULES WHICH DETERMINE PROPERTY
Though the establishment of the rule, concerning the stability of
possession, be not only useful, but even absolutely necessary to human
society, it can never serve to any purpose, while it remains in such
general terms. Some method must be shewn, by which we may distinguish
what particular goods are to be assigned to each particular person,
while the rest of mankind are excluded from their possession and
enjoyment. Our next business, then, must be to discover the reasons
which modify this general rule, and fit it to the common use and
practice of the world.
It is obvious, that those reasons are not derived from any utility or
advantage, which either the particular person or the public may reap
from his enjoyment of any particular goods, beyond what would result
from the possession of them by any other person. Twere better, no doubt,
that every one were possessed of what is most suitable to him, and
proper for his use: But besides, that this relation of fitness may be
common to several at once, it is liable to so many controversies, and
men are so partial and passionate in judging of these controversies,
that such a loose and uncertain rule would be absolutely incompatible
with the peace of human society. The convention concerning the stability
of possession is entered into, in order to cut off all occasions of
discord and contention; and this end would never be attained, were
we allowed to apply this rule differently in every particular case,
according to every particular utility, which might be discovered in such
an application. Justice, in her decisions, never regards the fitness or
unfitness of objects to particular persons, but conducts herself by more
extensive views. Whether a man be generous, or a miser, he is equally
well received by her, and obtains with the same facility a decision in
his favours, even for what is entirely useless to him.
It follows therefore, that the general rule, that possession must be
stable, is not applied by particular
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