ons,
concurred in by the whole society, is infinitely advantageous to the
whole, and to every part; it is not long before justice and property
take place. Every member of society is sen sible of this interest: Every
one expresses this sense to his fellows, along with the resolution he
has taken of squaring his actions by it, on condition that others will
do the same. No more is requisite to induce any one of them to perform
an act of justice, who has the first opportunity. This becomes an
example to others. And thus justice establishes itself by a kind of
convention or agreement; that is, by a sense of interest, supposed to
be common to all, and where every single act is performed in expectation
that others are to perform the like. Without such a convention, no one
would ever have dreamed, that there was such a virtue as justice, or
have been induced to conform his actions to it. Taking any single act,
my justice may be pernicious in every respect; and it is only upon
the supposition that others are to imitate my example, that I can be
induced to embrace that virtue; since nothing but this combination can
render justice advantageous, or afford me any motives to conform my self
to its rules.

We come now to the second question we proposed, viz. Why we annex the
idea of virtue to justice, and of vice to injustice. This question
will not detain us long after the principles, which we have already
established, All we can say of it at present will be dispatched in a few
words: And for farther satisfaction, the reader must wait till we come
to the third part of this book. The natural obligation to justice, viz,
interest, has been fully explained; but as to the moral obligation, or
the sentiment of right and wrong, it will first be requisite to examine
the natural virtues, before we can give a full and satisfactory account
of it. After men have found by experience, that their selfishness and
confined generosity, acting at their liberty, totally incapacitate
them for society; and at the same time have observed, that society is
necessary to the satisfaction of those very passions, they are naturally
induced to lay themselves under the restraint of such rules, as may
render their commerce more safe and commodious. To the imposition then,
and observance of these rules, both in general, and in every particular
instance, they are at first induced only by a regard to interest; and
this motive, on the first formation of society, is suf