n,
along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that
justice derives its origin. If we look backward we shall find, that this
proposition bestows an additional force on some of those observations,
which we have already made on this subject.

First, we may conclude from it, that a regard to public interest, or a
strong extensive benevolence, is not our first and original motive for
the observation of the rules of justice; since it is allowed, that if
men were endowed with such a benevolence, these rules would never have
been dreamt of.

Secondly, we may conclude from the same principle, that the sense
of justice is not founded on reason, or on the discovery of certain
connexions and relations of ideas, which are eternal, immutable, and
universally obligatory. For since it is confest, that such an alteration
as that above-mentioned, in the temper and circumstances of mankind,
would entirely alter our duties and obligations, it is necessary upon
the common system, that the sense of virtue is derived from reason, to
shew the change which this must produce in the relations and ideas. But
it is evident, that the only cause, why the extensive generosity of man,
and the perfect abundance of every thing, would destroy the very idea of
justice, is because they render it useless; and that, on the other hand,
his confined benevolence, and his necessitous condition, give rise to
that virtue, only by making it requisite to the publick interest, and to
that of every individual. Twas therefore a concern for our own, and
the publick interest, which made us establish the laws of justice; and
nothing can be more certain, than that it is not any relation of ideas,
which gives us this concern, but our impressions and sentiments, without
which every thing in nature is perfectly indifferent to us, and can
never in the least affect us. The sense of justice, therefore, is not
founded on our ideas, but on our impressions.

Thirdly, we may farther confirm the foregoing proposition, THAT THOSE
IMPRESSIONS, WHICH GIVE RISE TO THIS SENSE OF JUSTICE, ARE NOT NATURAL
TO THE MIND OF MAN, BUT ARISE FROM ARTIFICE AND HUMAN CONVENTIONS. For
since any considerable alteration of temper and circumstances destroys
equally justice and injustice; and since such an alteration has an
effect only by changing our own and the publick interest; it follows,
that the first establishment of the rules of justice depends on these
different interests.