turally in; and that
is a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of
their possessions and persons as they think fit, _within the bounds of
the law of nature_, without asking leave or depending upon the will of
any other man."[136] In perfect accordance with this definition,
Blackstone says: "This natural liberty consists in a power of acting as
one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, unless by the laws of
nature, being a right inherent in us by birth, and one of the gifts of
God to man at his creation, when he endowed him with the faculty of
free-will." Such, according to Locke and Blackstone, is that natural
liberty, which is limited and abridged, as they suppose, when we enter
into the bonds of civil society.

Now mark its features: it is the gift of God to man at his creation; the
very top and flower of his existence; that by which he is distinguished
from the lower animals and raised to the rank of moral and accountable
beings. Shall we sacrifice this divine gift, then, in order to secure
the blessings of civil society? Shall we abridge or mutilate the image
of God, stamped upon the soul at its creation, by which we are capable
of knowing and obeying his law, in order to secure the aid and
protection of man? Shall we barter away any portion of this our glorious
birthright for any poor boon of man's devising? Yes, we are told--and
why? Because, says Blackstone, "Legal obedience and conformity is
infinitely more valuable than _the wild and savage liberty which is
sacrificed to obtain it_."

But how is this? _Now_ this natural liberty is a thing of light, and
_now_ it is a power of darkness. Now it is the gift of God, that moves
within a sphere of light, and breathes an atmosphere of love; and anon,
it is a wild and savage thing that carries terror in its train. It would
be an angel of light, if it were not a power of darkness; and it would
be a power of darkness, if it were not an angel of light. But as it is,
it is both by turns, and neither long, but runs through its Protean
changes, according to the exigencies of the flowing discourse of the
learned author. Surely such inconsistency, so glaring and so portentous,
and all exhibited on one and the same page, is no evidence that the
genius of the great commentator was as steady and profound as it was
elegant and classical.

The source of this vacillation is obvious. With Locke, he defines
natural liberty to be a power of acting as one