this
true? The doing of mischief is contrary to the law of nature, and hence,
according to the definition of Blackstone himself, the perpetration of
it is not an exercise of any natural right. As no man possesses a
natural right to do mischief, so the law which forbids it does not
diminish the natural liberty of mankind. The law which forbids mischief
is a restraint not upon the _natural liberty_, but upon the _natural
tyranny_, of man.

Blackstone is by no means alone in the error to which we have alluded.
By one of the clearest thinkers and most beautiful writers of the
present age,[137] it is argued, "that as government implies restraint,
it is evident we give up a certain portion of our liberty by entering
into it." This argument would be valid, no doubt, if there were nothing
in the world beside liberty to be restrained; but the evil passions of
men, from which proceed so many frightful tyrannies and wrongs, are not
to be identified with their rights or liberties. As government implies
restraint, it is evident that something is restrained when we enter into
it; but it does not follow that this something must be our natural
liberty. The argument in question proceeds on the notion that government
can restrain nothing, unless it restrain the natural liberty of mankind;
whereas, we have seen, the law which forbids the perpetration of
mischief, or any other wrong, is a restriction, not upon the _liberty_,
but upon the _tyranny_, of the human will. It sets a bound and limit,
not to any right conferred on us by the Author of nature, but upon the
evil thoughts and deeds of which we are the sole and exclusive
originators. Such a law, indeed, so far from restraining the natural
liberty of man, recognizes his natural rights, and secures his freedom,
by protecting the weak against the injustice and oppression of the
strong. The way in which these authors show that natural liberty is, and
of right ought to be, abridged by the laws of society, is, by
identifying this natural freedom, not with a power to act as God wills,
but with a power in conformity with our own sovereign will and pleasure.
The same thing is expressly done by Paley.[138] "To do what we will,"
says he, "is natural liberty." Starting from this definition, it is no
wonder that he should have supposed that natural liberty is restrained
by civil government. In like manner, Burke first says, "That the effect
of liberty to individuals is, _that they may do what they