lely and exclusively the public good.
It is on this principle that foreigners are not allowed to vote as soon
as they land upon our shores, and that native Americans can do so only
after they have reached a certain age. And if the public good required
that any class of men, such as free blacks or slaves, for example,
should be excluded from the privilege altogether, then no doubt can
remain the law excluding them would be just. It might not be equal, but
would be _just_. Indeed, in the high and holy sense of the word, it
would be equal; for, if it excluded some from a privilege or power which
it conferred upon others, this is because they were not included within
the condition on which alone it should be extended to any. Such is not
an equality of rights and power, it is true; but it is an equality of
justice, like that which reigns in the divine government itself. In the
light of that justice, it is clear that no man, and no class of men, can
have a natural right to exercise a power which, if intrusted to them,
would be wielded for harm, and not for good.

This great truth, when stripped of the manifold sophistications of a
false logic, is so clear and unquestionable, that it has not failed to
secure the approbation of abolitionists themselves. Thus, after all his
wild extravagancies about inherent, inalienable, and equal rights, Dr.
Channing has, in one of his calmer moods, recognized this great
fundamental truth. "The slave," says he, "cannot rightfully, and should
not, be owned by the individual. But, like every citizen, _he is subject
to the community_, AND THE COMMUNITY HAS A RIGHT AND IS BOUND TO
CONTINUE ALL SUCH RESTRAINTS AS ITS OWN SAFETY AND THE WELL-BEING OF THE
SLAVE DEMANDS." Now this is all we ask in regard to the question of
equal rights. All we ask is, that each and every individual may be in
such wise and so far restrained as the public good demands and no
further. All we ask is, as may be seen from the first chapter of this
Essay, that the right of the individual, whether real or imaginary, may
be held in subjection to the undoubted right of the community to protect
itself and to secure its own highest good. This solemn right, so
inseparably linked to a sacred duty, is paramount to the rights and
powers of the individual. Nay, as we have already seen,[159] the
individual can have no right that conflicts with this; because it is
his _duty_ to co-operate in the establishment of the general good.
Surely