he can have no right which is adverse to duty. Indeed, if for the
general good, he would not cheerfully lay down both liberty and life,
then both may be rightfully taken from him. We have, it is true,
inherent and _inalienable rights_, but among these is neither liberty
nor life. For these, upon our country's altar, may be sacrificed; but
conscience, truth, honor may not be touched by man.

Has the community, then, after all, the right to compel "a man," a
"rational and immortal being," to work? Let Dr. Channing answer: "If he
(the slave) cannot be induced to work by rational and natural motives,
_he should be obliged to labor, on the same principle on which the
vagrant in other communities is confined and compelled to earn his
bread_." Now, if a man be "confined, and compelled" to work in his
confinement, what becomes of his "inalienable right to liberty?" We
think there must be a slight mistake somewhere. Perhaps it is in the
Declaration of Independence itself. Nay, is it not evident, indeed, that
if all men have an inalienable right to liberty," then is this sacred
right trampled in the dust by every government on earth? Is it not as
really disregarded by the enlightened Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
which "confines and compels" vagrants to earn their bread, as it is by
the Legislature of Virginia, which has taken the wise precaution to
prevent the rise of a swarm of vagrants more destructive than the
locusts of Egypt? The plain truth is, that although this notion of the
"inalienable right" of all to liberty may sound very well in a
declaration of independence, and may be most admirably adapted to stir
up the passions of men and produce fatal commotions in a commonwealth,
yet no wise nation ever has been or ever will be guided by it in the
construction of her laws. It may be a brand of discord in the hands of
the abolitionist and the demagogue. It will never be an element of
light, or power, or wisdom, in the bosom of the statesman.

"The gift of liberty," continues Dr. Channing, "would be a mere name,
and worse than nominal, were he (the slave) to be let loose on society
under circumstances driving him to commit crimes, for which he would be
condemned to severer bondage than he had escaped." If then, after all,
liberty may be worse than a mere name, is it not a pity that all men
should have an "inalienable right" to it? If it may be a curse, is it
not a pity that all men should be required to embrace it, and to be