e,
even among you, in that place which he shall choose in one of the gates
where it liketh him best: thou shalt not oppress him."[167] "This
precept, I think," says Dr. Wayland, "clearly shows that Moses intended
to abolish slavery. How could slavery long continue in a country where
every one was forbidden to deliver up a fugitive slave? How different
would be the condition of slaves, and how soon would slavery itself
cease, were this the law of compulsory bondage among us!"

The above passage of Scripture is a precious morsel with those who are
opposed to a fugitive slave law. A petition from Albany, New York, from
the enlightened seat of empire of the Empire State itself, signed, if we
recollect right, by one hundred and fifty persons, was presented to the
United States Senate by Mr. Seward, praying that no bill in relation to
fugitive slaves might be passed, which should not contain that passage.
Whether Mr. Seward was enlightened by his constituents, or whether he
made the discovery for himself, it is certain that he holds an act for
the reclamation of fugitive slaves to be "contrary to the divine law."
It is certain that he agrees with his constituents, who, in the petition
referred to, pronounced every such act "immoral," and contrary to the
law of God. But let us look at this passage a little, and see if these
abolitionists, who thus plant themselves so confidently upon "a higher
law," even upon "the divine law" itself, be not as hasty and rash in
their interpretation of this law as they are accustomed to be in their
judgment respecting the most universal and long-established institutions
of human society.

In the first place, if their interpretation be correct, we are at once
met by a very serious difficulty. For we are required to believe that
one passage of Scripture grants an "authority to take slaves," while
another passage is designed to annul this authority. We are required to
believe that, in one portion of the divine law, the right of the master
to hold his slaves as "bondmen" is recognized, while another part of the
same law denies the existence of such right. In fine, we are required to
believe that the legislator of the Jews intended, in one and the same
code, both to establish and to abolish slavery; that with one hand he
struck down the very right and institution which he had set up with the
other. How Dr. Channing and Mr. Sumner would have disposed of this
difficulty we know full well, for they ca