the immediate abolition of slavery."
Yet, in the light of the foregoing discussion, it may be clearly shown
that the doctrine of inalienable rights, if properly handled, will not
touch the institution of slavery.

An inalienable right is either one which the possessor of it himself
cannot alienate or transfer, or it is one which society has not the
power to take from him. According to the import of the terms, the first
would seem to be what is meant by an inalienable right; but in this
sense it is not pretended that the right to either life or liberty has
been transferred to society or alienated by the individual. And if, as
we have endeavored to show, the right, or power, or authority of society
is not derived from a transfer of individual rights, then it is clear
that neither the right to life nor liberty is transferred to society.
That is, if no rights are transferred, than these particular rights are
still untransferred, and, if you please, untransferable. Be it conceded,
then, that the individual has never transferred his right to life or
liberty to society.

But it is not in the above sense that the abolitionist uses the
expression, _inalienable rights_. According to his view, an inalienable
right is one of which society itself cannot, without doing wrong,
deprive the individual, or deny the enjoyment of it to him. This is
evidently his meaning; for he complains of the injustice of society, or
civil government, in depriving a certain portion of its subjects of
civil freedom, and consigning them to a state of servitude. "Such an
act," says he, "is wrong, because it is a violation of the inalienable
rights of all men." But let us see if his complaint be just or well
founded.

It is pretended by no one that society has the right to deprive any
subject of either life or liberty, _without good and sufficient cause or
reason_. On the contrary, it is on all hands agreed that it is only for
good and sufficient reasons that society can deprive any portion of its
subjects of either life or liberty. Nor can it be denied, on the other
side, that a man may be deprived of either, or both, by a preordained
law, in case there be a good and sufficient reason for the enactment of
such law. For the crime of murder, the law of the land deprives the
criminal of life: _a fortiori_, might it deprive him of liberty. In the
infliction of such a penalty, the law seeks, as we have seen, not to
deal out so much pain for so much guilt, nor