a corresponding obligation. If, then, a man has a right to another's
person or powers, the latter is under obligation to give himself up as
a chattel to the former." Most assuredly, if one man has a right to the
service or obedience of another, then that other is under obligation to
render that service or obedience to him. But is such an obligation
absurd? Is it inconsistent with the inherent, the inalienable, the
universal rights of man that the "servant should obey his master?" If
so, then we fear the rights of man were far better understood by Dr.
Channing than by the Creator of the world and the Author of revelation.
Such are the seven arguments adduced by Dr. Channing to show that no man
can rightfully hold property in his fellow-man. But before we quit this
branch of the subject, we shall advert to a passage in the address of
the Hon. Charles Sumner, before the people of New York, at the
Metropolitan Theatre, May 9, 1855. "I desire to present this argument,"
says he, "on grounds above all controversy, impeachment, or suspicion,
even from slave-masters themselves. Not on triumphant story, not even on
indisputable facts, do I now accuse slavery, but on its character, as
revealed in its own simple definition of itself. Out of its own mouth do
I condemn it." Well, and why does he condemn it? Because, "by the law of
slavery, man, created in the image of God, is _divested of his human
character_ and declared to be a _mere_ chattel. That the statement may
not seem to be put forward without precise authority, I quote the law of
two different slave States." That is the accusation. It is to be proved
by the law of slavery itself. It is to be proved beyond "all
controversy," by an appeal to "indisputable facts." Now let us have the
facts: here they are. "The law of another polished slave State, says Mr.
Sumner, "gives this definition: 'Slaves shall be delivered, sold, taken,
reputed, and adjudged in law to be chattels personal, in the hands of
their owners and possessors, and their executors, administrators, and
assignees, to all intents, constructions, and purposes whatsoever.'"
Now, _mark_; the learned Senator undertook to prove, beyond all doubt
and controversy, that slavery _divests the slave of his human
character_, and declares him to be a _mere_ chattel. But he merely
proves that it declares him to be a "chattel personal." He merely proves
that the law of a Southern State regards the slave, not as real estate
or la
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