the Declaration of Independence; but, in this sense, they are
utterly untenable. If all men had, by nature, an equal right to any of
the offices of government, how could such rights be adjusted? How could
such a conflict be reconciled? It is clear that all men could not be
President of the United States; and if all men had an equal natural
right to that office, no one man could be elevated to it without a wrong
to all the rest. In such case, all men should have, at least, an equal
chance to occupy the presidential chair. Such equal chance could not
result from the right of all men to offer themselves as candidates for
the office; for, at the bar of public opinion, vast multitudes would not
have the least shadow of a chance. The only way to effect such an object
would be by resorting to the lot. We might thus determine who, among so
many equally just claimants, should actually possess the power of the
supreme magistrate. This, it must be confessed, would be to recognize in
deed, as well as in word, the equal rights of all men. But what more
absurd than such an equality of rights? It is not without example in
history; but it is to be hoped that such example will never be copied.
The democracy of Athens, it is well known, was, at one time, so far
carried away by the idea of equal rights, that her generals and orators
and poets were elected by the lot. This was an equality, not in theory
merely, but in practice. Though the lives and fortunes of mankind were
thus intrusted to the most ignorant and depraved, or to the most wise
and virtuous, as the lot might determine, yet this policy was based on
an equality of rights. It is scarcely necessary to add that this idea of
equality prevailed, not in the better days of the Athenian democracy,
but only during its imbecility and corruption.

If all men, then, have not a natural right to fill an office of
government, who has this right? Who has the natural right, for example,
to occupy the office of President of the United States? Certainly some
men have no such right. The man, for example, who has no capacity to
govern himself, but needs a guardian, has no right to superintend the
affairs of a great nation. Though a citizen, he has no more right to
exercise such power or authority than if he were a Hottentot, or an
African, or an ape. Hence, in bidding such a one to stand aside and
keep aloof from such high office, no right is infringed and no injury
done. Nay, right is secured, and