in pursuance of rights derived from the individual.

Sec. IV. _The distinction between rights and liberty._

In the foregoing discussion we have, in conformity to the custom of
others, used the terms _rights_ and _liberty_ as words of precisely the
same import. But, instead of being convertible terms, there seems to be
a very clear difference in their signification. If a man be taken, for
example, and without cause thrown into prison, this deprives him of his
_liberty_, but not of his _right_, to go where he pleases. The right
still exists; and his not being allowed to enjoy this right, is
precisely what constitutes the oppression in the case supposed. If there
were no right still subsisting, then there would be no oppression.
Hence, as the _right_ exists, while the _liberty_ is extinguished, it is
evident they are distinct from each other. The liberty of a man in such
a case, as in all others, would consist in an opportunity to enjoy his
right, or in a state in which it might be enjoyed if he so pleased.

This distinction between rights and liberty is all-important to a clear
and satisfactory discussion of the doctrine of human freedom. The great
champions of that freedom, from a Locke down to a Hall, firmly and
passionately grasping the natural rights of man, and confounding these
with his liberty, have looked upon society as the restrainer, and not as
the author, of that liberty. On the other hand, the great advocates of
despotic power, from a Hobbes down to a Whewell, seeing that there can
be no genuine liberty--that is, no secure enjoyment of one's rights--in
a state of nature, have ascribed, not only our liberty, but all our
existing rights also, to the State.

But the error of Locke is a noble and generous sentiment when compared
with the odious dogma of Hobbes and Whewell. These learned authors
contend that we derive all our existing rights from society. Do we,
then, live and move and breathe and think and worship God only by rights
derived from the State? No, certainly. We have these rights from a
higher source. God gave them, and all the powers of earth combined
cannot take them away. But as for our liberty, this we freely own is,
for the most part, due to the sacred bonds of civil society. Let us
render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things
that are God's.

Sec. V. _The relation between the state of nature and of civil society._

Herein, then, consists the true relation be