al
prosperity, upon the solution of which the hopes and destinies of
mankind in no inconsiderable measure depend. We intend no appeal to
passion or to sordid interest, but only to the reason of the wise and
good. And if justice, or mercy, or truth, be found at war with the
institution of slavery, then, in the name of God, let slavery perish.
But however guilty, still let it be tried, condemned, and executed
according to law, and not extinguished by a despotic and lawless power
more terrific than itself.

Sec. I. _The commonly-received definition of civil liberty._

"Civil liberty," says Blackstone, "is no other than natural liberty so
far restrained as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage."
This definition seems to have been borrowed from Locke, who says that,
when a man enters into civil society, "he is to part with so much of his
_natural liberty_, in providing for himself, as the good, prosperity,
and safety of the society shall require." So, likewise, say Paley,
Berlamaqui, Rutherforth, and a host of others. Indeed, among jurists and
philosophers, such seems to be the commonly-received definition of civil
liberty. It seems to have become a political maxim that civil liberty is
no other than a certain portion of our natural liberty, which has been
carved therefrom, and secured to us by the protection of the laws.

But is this a sound maxim? Has it been deduced from the nature of
things, or is it merely a plausible show of words? Is it truth--solid
and imperishable truth--or merely one of those fair semblances of truth,
which, through the too hasty sanction of great names, have obtained a
currency among men? The question is not what Blackstone, or Locke, or
Paley may have thought, but what is truth? Let us examine this point,
then, in order that our decision may be founded, not upon the authority
of man, but, if possible, in the wisdom of God.

Sec. II. _Examination of the commonly-received definition of civil
liberty._

Before we can determine whether such be the origin of civil liberty, we
must first ascertain the character of that natural liberty out of which
it is supposed to be reserved. What, then, is natural liberty? What is
the nature of the material out of which our civil liberty is supposed to
be fashioned by the art of the political sculptor? It is thus defined by
Locke: "To understand political power right, and derive it from its
original, we must consider what state all men are na