niversal and perfect goodness, because he can acquire
beatitude. Yet he is in the last degree, according to his nature,
of those to whom beatitude is possible; therefore the human soul
requires many and various operations and powers. But to angels a
smaller variety of powers is sufficient. In God there is no power
or action beyond His own Essence.

There is yet another reason why the human soul abounds in a variety of
powers--because it is on the confines of spiritual and corporeal
creatures; and therefore the powers of both meet together in the soul.

Reply Obj. 1: The intellectual soul approaches to the Divine
likeness, more than inferior creatures, in being able to acquire
perfect goodness; although by many and various means; and in this it
falls short of more perfect creatures.

Reply Obj. 2: A unified power is superior if it extends to equal
things: but a multiform power is superior to it, if it is over many
things.

Reply Obj. 3: One thing has one substantial existence, but may have
several operations. So there is one essence of the soul, with several
powers.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 3]

Whether the Powers Are Distinguished by Their Acts and Objects?

Objection 1: It would seem that the powers of the soul are not
distinguished by acts and objects. For nothing is determined to its
species by what is subsequent and extrinsic to it. But the act is
subsequent to the power; and the object is extrinsic to it. Therefore
the soul's powers are not specifically distinct by acts and objects.

Obj. 2: Further, contraries are what differ most from each other.
Therefore if the powers are distinguished by their objects, it follows
that the same power could not have contrary objects. This is clearly
false in almost all the powers; for the power of vision extends to
white and black, and the power to taste to sweet and bitter.

Obj. 3: Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed.
Hence if the difference of powers came from the difference of objects,
the same object would not come under different powers. This is clearly
false; for the same thing is known by the cognitive power, and desired
by the appetitive.

Obj. 4: Further, that which of itself is the cause of anything, is
the cause thereof, wherever it is. But various objects which belong
to various powers, belong also to some one power; as sound and color
belong to sight and hearing, which are different powers, yet they
com