the members of the general government on the State
comprehending the seat of the government, for protection in the exercise
of their duty, might bring on the national councils an imputation of awe
or influence, equally dishonorable to the government and dissatisfactory
to the other members of the Confederacy. This consideration has the
more weight, as the gradual accumulation of public improvements at the
stationary residence of the government would be both too great a public
pledge to be left in the hands of a single State, and would create
so many obstacles to a removal of the government, as still further to
abridge its necessary independence. The extent of this federal district
is sufficiently circumscribed to satisfy every jealousy of an opposite
nature. And as it is to be appropriated to this use with the consent of
the State ceding it; as the State will no doubt provide in the compact
for the rights and the consent of the citizens inhabiting it; as the
inhabitants will find sufficient inducements of interest to become
willing parties to the cession; as they will have had their voice in the
election of the government which is to exercise authority over them;
as a municipal legislature for local purposes, derived from their own
suffrages, will of course be allowed them; and as the authority of the
legislature of the State, and of the inhabitants of the ceded part of
it, to concur in the cession, will be derived from the whole people
of the State in their adoption of the Constitution, every imaginable
objection seems to be obviated.
The necessity of a like authority over forts, magazines, etc.,
established by the general government, is not less evident. The public
money expended on such places, and the public property deposited in
them, requires that they should be exempt from the authority of the
particular State. Nor would it be proper for the places on which the
security of the entire Union may depend, to be in any degree dependent
on a particular member of it. All objections and scruples are here also
obviated, by requiring the concurrence of the States concerned, in every
such establishment.
3. "To declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason
shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of
the person attained."
As treason may be committed against the United States, the authority of
the United States ought to be enabled to punish it. But as new-fangled
and artific
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