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NAVAL STRATEGY

Naval strategy does not exist as a separate branch of knowledge. It is only
a section of a division of the art of war.

The study for officers is the art of war, specialising in Naval Strategy.

The true method of procedure then is to get hold of a general theory of
war, and so ascertain the exact relations of Naval Strategy to the whole.

War is a form of political intercourse, a continuation of foreign politics
which begins when force is introduced to attain our ends.

OBJECTS.

We seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, which may be
ulterior or immediate.

Immediate objects (also called "Primary") are the ends of particular
operations or movements. But it must be remembered that every primary
object has also its ulterior object; that is, every operation must be
regarded, not only from the point of view of its special object, but also
as a step to the end of the campaign or war.

Strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view. Classified by
the object it is Major Strategy, dealing with ulterior objects; Minor
Strategy, with primary objects.

This also means that every operation of an army or fleet must be regarded
in a double light, _i.e._, it must be planned and conducted in relation (1)
to the general progress of the war; (2) to the object to which it is
immediately directed.

Major Strategy (always regarding the ulterior object) has for its province
the plan of the war, and includes: (1) Selection of the immediate or
primary objects to be aimed at for attaining the ulterior object; (2)
Selection of the force to be used, i.e., it determines the relative
functions of the naval and military forces.

NOTE.--Major Strategy in its broadest sense has also to deal with the
whole resources of the nation for war. It is a branch of statesmanship.
It regards the Army and Navy as parts of one force, to be handled
together; they are instruments of war. But it also has to keep in view
constantly the politico-diplomatic position of the country (on which
depends the effective action of the instrument), and its commercial and
financial position (by which the energy for working the instrument is
maintained). The friction of these two considerations is inherent in
war, and we call it the deflection of strategy by politics. It is
usually regarded as a disease. It is really a vital factor in every