e to send a squadron to sea.
It is to the advantage of the preponderating Navy to end the state of
dispute by seeking a decision. Hence the French tradition to avoid decisive
actions as a rule when at war with England.
The truth of this appears from the fact that _general command of the sea is
not essential to all oversea operations_.
In a state of dispute the preponderating Power may concentrate in one
theatre of operations, and so secure the local or temporary command
sufficient for obtaining the special object in view. The weaker Power may
take advantage of such local concentration to operate safely elsewhere.
_Rule 1._ So long as a state of dispute can force the preponderating Power
to concentrate, operating by evasion is possibly open to the weaker.
_Rule 2._ In a state of dispute although the weaker Power may not be able
to obstruct the passage and communication of the stronger, it may be able
to defend its own.
EXAMPLES.--This condition of dispute existed during the first three
years of the Seven Years War, until Hawke and Boscawen obtained a
decision by defeating Conflans and De la Cloue; also in the Great War
up to Trafalgar.
SHOULD COMMAND OF THE SEA ALWAYS BE THE
PRIMARY OBJECT?
When the preponderating Power fails or neglects to get command (_i.e._,
leaves the general command in dispute), the disadvantage to him is not so
much the danger to his own operations as the facility given to the enemy
for carrying out counter operations elsewhere.
Under certain conditions, therefore, it may not be the primary function of
the fleet to seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it, because general
command may be in dispute while local command may be with us, and political
or military considerations may demand of us an operation, for which such
local command is sufficient, and which cannot be delayed until we have
obtained a complete decision.
From the above it will appear "command of the sea" is too loose an
expression for strategical discussion. For practical purposes should be
substituted "_control of passage and communication_."
The question then in the consideration of any proposed operation or line of
operations will be, not "Have we the command of the sea?" but "Can we
secure the necessary lines of communication from obstruction by the enemy?"
METHODS OF SECURING CONTROL
1. _Permanent general control_ can only be secured by the practical
annihilation of the enemy's fleet by
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