NCIPLES AND DEFINITIONS

INTRODUCTORY

Naval strategy is a section of the Art of War.

The study for officers is the Art of War, which includes Naval Strategy.

War is the application of force to the attainment of political ends.

MAJOR AND MINOR STRATEGY

We seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, which may be
ulterior or primary.

_Primary objects_ are the special objects of particular operations or
movements which we undertake in order to gain the ulterior object of the
campaign. Consequently it must be remembered that every particular
operation or movement must be regarded, not only from the point of view of
its special object, but also as a step to the end of the campaign or war.

Strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view. There are two
kinds--Major Strategy, dealing with ulterior objects; Minor Strategy, with
primary objects.

Every operation of an army or fleet must be planned and conducted in
relation (1) to the general plan of the war; (2) to the object to which it
is immediately directed.

Major Strategy, always regarding the ulterior object, has for its province
the plan of the war and includes: (1) Selection of the immediate or primary
objects to be aimed at for attaining the ulterior object; (2) Selection of
the force to be used, _i.e._, it determines the relative functions of the
naval and military forces. Major Strategy in its broadest sense deals with
the whole resources of the nation for war. It is a branch of statesmanship
which regards the Army and Navy as parts of one force, to be handled
together as the instrument of war. But it also has to keep in constant
touch with the political and diplomatic position of the country (on which
depends the effective action of the instrument), and the commercial and
financial position (by which the energy for working the instrument is
maintained). The friction due to these considerations is inherent in war,
and is called the deflection of strategy by politics. It is usually
regarded as a disease. It is really a vital factor in every strategical
problem. It may be taken as a general rule that no question of major
strategy can be decided apart from diplomacy, and _vice versa_. For a line
of action or an object which is expedient from the point of view of
strategy may be barred by diplomatic considerations, and _vice versa_. To
decide a question of Major Strategy, without consideration of its
diplomatic aspect, is to decide o