munications.

RESULT.--By 1704 we had gained a Naval position from which France could
not eject us, and she abandoned struggle for sea communications.

But nine times out of ten the maxim of seeking out the enemy's fleet, &c.,
is sound and applicable:--

(a) Because for us _general permanent command_ is usually essential
to ultimate success, and this cannot be obtained without destroying the
enemy's fleet.

(b) Because usually the enemy's fleet opens with an attempt _to
control the common communications_.

(c) Because usually the functions of the fleet are so complex
(_i.e._, the calls upon it so numerous) that it will seek to strike a
blow which solve all the difficulties; _e.g._, Sir Palmes Fairborne's
solution of the problem in 1703 (_England in the Mediterranean_, Vol.
II., p. 234).

Also it must be remembered that nine times out of ten the most effective
way of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" (_i.e._, forcing an action on him)
is to seize a position which controls communications vital to his plan of
campaign.

This was what happened in 1704. Rooke was unable to seek out the Toulon
fleet, but by seizing Gibraltar he made it come to him (not intentionally,
but by the operation of inevitable strategical law).

Compare Togo's strategy and that of the Americans in 1898.

Practically all great Naval actions have been brought about in this way,
that is they have been the outcome on an effort to clear essential
communications from the enemy's fleet, _e.g._, Gravelines, La Hogue,
Quiberon, Trafalgar, Tsushima.

Similarly the great actions of the old Dutch wars were brought about
because our geographical position placed us astride the Dutch trade
communications, and they were forced to seek a decision against our fleet.

FINAL NOTE

In applying the maxim of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" it should be borne
in mind:--

(1) That if you seek it out with a superior force you will probably
find it in a place where you cannot destroy it except at heavy cost.

(2) That seeing that the defensive is a stronger form of war than the
offensive, it is _prima facie_ better strategy to make the enemy come
to you than to go to him and seek a decision on his own ground.

* * * * *

WAR COURSE

* * * * *

Notes on Strategy

* * * * *

PART ONE

GENERAL PRI