n half the factors only. Neither strategy
or diplomacy has ever a clean slate. This inter-action has to be accepted
as part of the inevitable "friction of war." A good example is Pitt's
refusal to send a fleet into the Baltic to assist Frederick the Great
during the Seven Years' War, for fear of compromising our relations with
the Scandinavian Powers.

Minor Strategy has for its province the plans of operations. It deals
with--

(1) The selection of the "objectives," that is, the particular forces
of the enemy or the strategical points to be dealt with in order to
secure the object of the particular operation.

(2) The direction of the force assigned for the operation.

Minor Strategy may, therefore, be of three kinds:--

(1) Naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by a fleet
only.

(2) Military, where the immediate object is to be attained by an army
only.

(3) Combined, where the immediate object is to be attained by army and
navy together.

It will be seen, therefore, that what is usually called Naval Strategy or
Fleet Strategy is only a sub-division of Strategy, and that therefore
Strategy cannot be studied from the point of view of naval operations only.
Naval Strategy, being a part of General Strategy, is subject to the same
friction as Major Strategy, though in a less degree. Individual commanders
have often to take a decision independently of the central government or
headquarters; they should, therefore, always keep in mind the possible
ulterior effects of any line of action they may take, endeavouring to be
sure that what is strategically expedient is not diplomatically
inexpedient.

Example.--For example, take Boscawen's attack on De la Motte on the eve of
the Seven Years' War in 1755. His orders were to prevent the troops and
warlike stores which De la Motte was taking out from reaching Canada. It
was not diplomatically expedient to open hostilities; but if Boscawen
succeeded, the result would have been worth the diplomatic consequences it
would entail. He missed the expedition, but captured two isolated vessels;
thus striking the first blow in such a way as to entail the utmost amount
of harm with the least possible good.

OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE

_Nature of Object_

Upon the nature of the object depends the fundamental distinction between
_offensive_ and _defensive_, upon which all strategical calculation must be
based. Consequently, the s