fleet (except in purely
maritime wars) have been threefold:--

1. The furtherance or hindrance of military operations ashore.

2. The protection or destruction of commerce.

3. The prevention or securing of alliances (_i.e._, deterring or
persuading neutrals as to participating in the war).

EXAMPLES.--The operations of Rooke in the first years of the War of the
Spanish Succession, 1702-04, to secure the adhesion of Savoy and Portugal
to the Grand Alliance. Operations of Nelson to maintain the alliance of the
Kingdom of Naples.

In the first case, there came a crisis when it was more important to
demonstrate to Savoy and Portugal what they stood to lose by joining Louis
XIV, than to act immediately against the Toulon Fleet. In the second, the
Neapolitan Alliance was essential to our operations in the Eastern
Mediterranean; the destruction of the Toulon Fleet was not.

In this way we get a _Definition of the Aim of Naval Strategy_, expressed
in terms of the actual functions of the fleet. For practical purposes it
will be found the most useful definition as emphasising the intimate
connection of Naval Strategy with the diplomatic, financial, and military
aspects of Major Strategy.

These functions of the fleet may be discharged in two ways:--

(1) By direct territorial attacks, threatened or performed
(bombardment, landings, raiding parties, &c.).

(2) By getting command of the sea, _i.e._, establishing ourselves in
such a position that we can control the maritime communications of all
parties concerned, so that we can operate by sea against the enemy's
territory, commerce, and allies, and they cannot operate against ours.

The power of the second method, by controlling communications, is out of
all proportion to that of the first--direct attack. Indeed, the first can
seldom be performed with any serious effect without the second. Thus, from
this point of view also, it is clear that Naval Strategy is mainly a
question of communications.

But not entirely. Circumstances have arisen when the fleet must discharge
part of its function by direct action against territory before there is
time to get general control of the communications. (That is, political and
military considerations may deflect the normal operation of Naval
Strategy.)

EXAMPLES.--Rooke's capture of Gibraltar in 1704, in the face of the
unshaken Toulon Fleet. Holmes's capture of Emden in 1758.

Still, the