obvious opening is to get our fleet into such a
position that it controls the common lines, unless defeated or evaded. This
was usually done in our old wars with France, by our attempting to get a
fleet off Brest before the French could sail.

Hence the maxims "That the proper place for our fleets is off the enemy's
coast," "The enemy's coast is our true frontier," and the like.

But these maxims are not universally true; witness Togo's strategy against
Rojesvensky, when he remained correctly upon his own coast.

Take, again, the maxim that the primary object of the fleet is to seek out
the enemy's fleet and destroy it. Here, again, Togo's practice was the
reverse of the maxim.

The true maxim is "The primary object of the fleet is to secure
communications, and if the enemy's fleet is in a position to render them
unsafe it must be put out of action."

The enemy's fleet usually is in this position, but not always.

EXAMPLE.--Opening of the War of the Spanish Succession. The operations of
1702 were to secure some point (Cadiz, Gibraltar, or Ferrol) on the Spanish
trade communications, the French lateral communications, and our own lines
of passage to the Mediterranean, where was to be our chief theatre of
operation. These last two lines were identical. In 1703, the chief
operations had for their object to secure the alliance of Savoy, and
particularly of Portugal. Rooke's official instructions directed that the
French fleet was to be ignored unless it threatened the common
communications.

RESULT.--By 1704 we had gained a naval position from which France could not
eject us, and she abandoned the struggle for sea communications.

But nine times out of ten the maxim of seeking out the enemy's fleet, &c.,
is sound and applicable--

(a) Because for us _general permanent command_ is usually essential
to ultimate success, and this cannot be obtained without destroying the
enemy's fleet.

(b) Because usually the enemy's fleet opens with an attempt to
_dispute the control of the common communications_.

(c) Because usually the functions of the fleet are so complex
(_i.e._, the calls upon it so numerous) that it will seek to strike a
blow which will solve all the difficulties; _e.g._, Sir. Palmes
Fairborne's solution of the problem in 1703.

Also it must be remembered that nine times out of ten the most effective
way of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" (_i.e._, forcing an action on