it may be a primary or immediate object, and even the ulterior
object of particular operations.

PROOF II.--_Inductive_, from history or past experience.--History shows
that the actual functions of the Fleet (except in purely maritime wars)
have been threefold.

1. The prevention or securing of alliances (_i.e._, deterring or persuading
neutrals as to participating in the war).

EXAMPLES.--The operations of Rooke in the first years of the War of the
Spanish Succession, 1702-04, to secure the adhesion of Savoy and
Portugal to the Grand Alliance. Operations of Nelson to maintain the
alliance of the Kingdom of Naples.

In the first case there came a crisis when it was more important to
demonstrate to Savoy and Portugal what they stood to lose by joining
Louis XIV than to act immediately against the Toulon Fleet. In the
second, the Neapolitan Alliance was essential to our operations in the
Eastern Mediterranean; the destruction of the Toulon Fleet was not.

2. The protection or destruction of commerce.

3. The furtherance or hindrance of military operations ashore.

NOTE.--The above is the best working "Definition of Naval Strategy," as
emphasising its intimate connection with diplomatic, financial, and
military aspects of major strategy.

These functions may be discharged in two ways:--

(1) By direct territorial attacks, threatened or performed
(bombardment, landing, raiding parties, &c).

(2) By getting command of the sea, _i.e._, establishing ourselves in
such a position that we can control the maritime communications of all
parties concerned, so that we can operate by sea against their
territory, commerce, and allies, and they cannot operate against ours.

NOTE.--The power of the second method, by controlling communications,
is out of all proportion to the first--direct attack. Indeed, the first
can seldom be performed with any serious effect without the second.
Thus, from this point of view also, it is clear that Naval Strategy is
mainly a question of communications.

But not entirely. Circumstances have arisen when the Fleet must
discharge part of its function by direct action before there is time
to get general control of the communications. (That is, political and
military considerations may deflect normal operation of Naval
Strategy.)

EXAMPLE.--Rooke's capture of Gibraltar in 1704, in the face