fear of their escorts being overpowered by
raiding squadrons. Consequently it was the practice, when the approach of
convoys was expected, to throw forward from the defended area groups of
powerful cruisers, and even battleship divisions, to meet them and
reinforce their escorts. Outward-bound convoys had their escorts similarly
strengthened till they were clear of the danger zone. The system was in
regular use both for home and colonial areas. In no sense did it constitute
a patrol of the routes. It was in practice and conception a system of
outposts, which at seasons of special risk amounted to an extension of the
defended areas combining with a reinforcement of the convoy escorts. Focal
points of lesser importance, such as Capes Finisterre and St. Vincent, were
similarly held by one or two powerful cruisers, and if necessary by a
squadron.
As has been already explained, owing to the peculiar conditions of the sea
and the common nature of maritime communications, these dispositions were
adopted as well for attack as defence, and the fertile areas, for the
defence of which a frigate captain was sent "on a cruise," were always
liable to bring him rich reward. His mission of defence carried with it the
best opportunities for attack.
In the full development of the system patrol lines did exist, but not for
the great routes. They were established to link up adjacent defended areas
and as a more scientific organisation of the cruiser outposts. In 1805 the
Gibraltar and the home areas were thus connected by a patrol line which
stretched from Cape St. Vincent through the Finisterre focal area to Cape
Clear, with a branch extending to the strategical centre off Ushant. The
new system was introduced at a time when we had reason to expect that the
French and Spanish fleets were to be devoted entirely to operations in
small raiding squadrons against our trade and colonies. Special provision
was therefore necessary to locate any such squadrons that might elude the
regular blockades, and to ensure that they should be adequately pursued.
The new lines were in fact intelligence patrols primarily, though they were
also regarded as the only means of protecting efficiently the southern
trade-route where it was flanked by French and Spanish ports.[24]
[24] It should be said that Cornwallis did not regard this system as new
except for the extension from Finisterre to St. Vincent, which Nelson
advised. In acknowledging the order
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