s absolutely
pedantic.* (* He instructed the orderly that accompanied him, and who
knew the roads, to call him "Colonel') But war, according to
Napoleon, is made up of accidents. The country was full of spies; the
Southern newspapers were sometimes indiscreet; and the simple fact
that Jackson had been seen near Richmond would have warned McClellan
that his right wing was in jeopardy. Few men would have taken such
infinite trouble to hide the departure from the Valley and the march
across Virginia to attack McClellan. But soldiers of experience,
alive to the full bearing of seemingly petty details, appreciate his
skill.* (* "The manner," says Lord Wolseley, "in which he thus
mystified his enemy regarding this most important movement is a
masterpiece." North American Review volume 149 pages 166 and 167.)
According to the dictum of Napoleon, "there are no such things as
trifles in war."
It was not, however, on such expedients that Jackson principally
relied to keep his enemy in the dark. The use he made of his cavalry
is perhaps the most brilliant tactical feature of the campaign.
Ashby's squadrons were the means whereby the Federals were mystified.
Not only was a screen established which perfectly concealed the
movements of the Valley army, but constant demonstrations, at far
distant points, alarmed and bewildered the Federal commanders. In his
employment of cavalry Jackson was in advance of his age. His patrols
were kept out two or three marches to front and flank; neither by day
nor by night were they permitted to lose touch of the enemy; and thus
no movement could take place without their knowledge. Such tactics
had not been seen since the days of Napoleon. The Confederate
horsemen in the Valley were far better handled than those of France
or Austria in 1859, of Prussia or Austria in 1866, of France in 1870,
of England, France, or Russia in the Crimea.
In the flank march on Sebastopol the hostile armies passed within a
few miles, in an open country, without either of them being aware of
the proximity of the other, and the English headquarter staff almost
rode into a Russian baggage-train. At Solferino and at Sadowa, armies
which were counted by hundreds of thousands encamped almost within
sight of each other's watch-fires, without the slightest suspicion
that the enemy lay over the next ridge. The practice of Napoleon had
been forgotten. The great cloud of horsemen which, riding sometimes a
hundred miles to the fr
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