of our artillery and
infantry; yet others pressed on, followed by supports daring and
brave as their predecessors, despite their heavy losses and the
disheartening effect of having to clamber over many of their disabled
and dead, and to meet their surviving comrades rushing back in great
disorder from the deadly contest."* (* Battles and Leaders of the
Civil War volume 2 page 337.) For over an hour Hill fought on without
support. There were no signs of Jackson, and Longstreet, whom it was
not intended to employ until Jackson's appearance should have caused
the Federals to denude their left, was then sent in to save the day.
As on the previous day, the Confederate attack had failed in
combination. Jackson's march had been again delayed. The direct road
from Walnut Grove Church to Old Cold Harbour, leading through the
forest, was found to be obstructed by felled timber and defended by
sharpshooters, and to save time Jackson's division struck off into
the road by Bethesda Church. This threw it in rear of D.H. Hill, and
it was near 2 P.M. when the latter's advanced guard reached the
tavern at the Old Cold Harbour cross roads. No harm, however, had
been done. A.P. Hill did not attack till half an hour later. But when
he advanced there came no response from the left. A battery of D.H.
Hill's division was brought into action, but was soon silenced, and
beyond this insignificant demonstration the Army of the Valley made
no endeavour to join the battle. The brigades were halted by the
roadside. Away to the right, above the intervening forest, rolled the
roar of battle, the crash of shells and the din of musketry, but no
orders were given for the advance.
Nor had Jackson's arrival produced the slightest consternation in the
Federal ranks. Although from his position at Cold Harbour he
seriously threatened their line of retreat to the White House, they
had neither denuded their left nor brought up their reserves. Where
he was now established he was actually nearer White House than any
portion of Porter's army corps, and yet that general apparently
accepted the situation with equanimity.
Lee had anticipated that Jackson's approach would cause the enemy to
prolong their front in order to cover their line of retreat to the
White House, and so weaken that part of the position which was to be
attacked by Longstreet; and Jackson had been ordered* to draw up his
troops so as to meet such a contingency. (* This order was verbal; no
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