s were hardly to be
trusted in a desperate assault, unsupported by artillery, on a
position which was even stronger than that which they had stormed
with such loss at Gaines' Mill.
Had Jackson thrown two columns across the fords--which the cavalry,
according to Munford, had not found easy,--and attempted to deploy on
the further bank, it was exceedingly probable that they would have
been driven back with tremendous slaughter. The refusal of the troops
to work at the bridge under fire was in itself a sign that they had
little stomach for hard fighting.
It may be argued that it was Jackson's duty to sacrifice his command
in order to draw off troops from Glendale. But on such unfavourable
ground the sacrifice would have been worse than useless. The attack
repulsed--and it could hardly have gone otherwise--Franklin, leaving
a small rear-guard to watch the fords, would have been free to turn
nearly his whole strength against Longstreet. It is quite true, as a
tactical principle, that demonstrations, such as Jackson made with
his artillery, are seldom to be relied upon to hold an enemy in
position. When the first alarm has passed off, and the defending
general becomes aware that nothing more than a feint is intended, he
will act as did the Federals, and employ his reserves elsewhere. A
vigorous attack is, almost invariably, the only means of keeping him
to his ground. But an attack which is certain to be repulsed, and to
be repulsed in quick time, is even less effective than a
demonstration. It may be the precursor of a decisive defeat.
But it is not so much for his failure to force the passage at White
Oak Swamp that Jackson has been criticised, as for his failure to
march to Frayser's Farm on finding that the Federal position was
impregnable. "When, on the forenoon of the 30th," writes Longstreet,
"Jackson found his way blocked by Franklin, he had time to march to
the head of it (White Oak Swamp), and across to the Charles City
road, in season for the engagement at Frayser's Farm [Glendale], the
distance being about four miles."* (* From Manassas to Appomattox
page 150.)
Without doubt this would have been a judicious course to pursue, but
it was not for Jackson to initiate such a movement. He had been
ordered by General Lee to move along the road to White Oak Swamp, to
endeavour to force his way to the Long Bridge road, to guard Lee's
left flank from any attack across the fords or bridges of the lower
Chickahominy
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