itude of the enemy. The day was hot and still. Round the
base of Slaughter Mountain, fifteen miles northward, clustered many
thousands of tents, and the blue smoke of the camp-fires rose
straight and thin in the sultry air. Regiments of infantry, just
discernible through the glare, were marching and countermarching in
various directions, and long waggon-trains were creeping slowly along
the dusty roads. Near at hand, rising above the tree-tops, the Union
colours showed that the outposts still held the river, and the flash
of steel at the end of some woodland vista betrayed the presence of
scouting party or vedette. But there were no symptoms of unusual
excitement, no sign of working parties, of reinforcements for the
advanced posts, of the construction of earthworks or abattis. Pope's
camps were scattered over a wide tract of country, his cavalry was
idle, and it seemed absolutely certain that he was unconscious of the
near neighbourhood of the Confederate army.
The inference was correct. The march to Pisgah Church had escaped
notice. The Federals were unaware that Lee had arrived at
Gordonsville, and they had as yet no reason to believe that there was
the smallest danger of attack.
Between Raccoon and Locustdale fords, and stretching back to Culpeper
Court House, 52,500 men--for Reno, with two divisions of Burnside's
army, 8000 strong, had arrived from Fredericksburg--were in camp and
bivouac. The front was protected by a river nearly a hundred yards
wide, of which every crossing was held by a detachment, and Pope had
reported that his position was so strong that it would be difficult
to drive him from it. But he had not made sufficient allowance for
the energy and ability of the Confederate leaders. His situation, in
reality, was one of extreme danger. In ordering Pope to the Rapidan,
and bidding him "fight like the devil'* (* O.R. volume 12 part 2 page
67. "It may have been fortunate for the Confederates," says
Longstreet, "that he was not instructed to fight like Jackson.")
until McClellan should come up, Halleck made the same fatal error as
Stanton, when he sent Shields up the Luray Valley in pursuit of
Jackson. He had put an inferior force within reach of an enemy who
held the interior lines, and had ordered two armies, separated by
several marches, to effect their concentration under the fire of the
enemy's guns. And if Pope's strategical position was bad, his
tactical position was even worse. His left, cover
|