ing Raccoon and
Somerville Fords, was very weak. The main body of his army was massed
on the opposite flank, several miles distant, astride the direct road
from Gordonsville to Culpeper Court House, and he remained without
the least idea, so late as the morning of the 18th, that the whole
Confederate army was concentrated behind Clark's Mountain, within six
miles of his most vulnerable point. Aware that Jackson was based on
Gordonsville, he seems to have been convinced that if he advanced at
all, he would advance directly on Culpeper Court House; and the move
to Pisgah Church, which left Gordonsville unprotected, never entered
into his calculations. A sudden attack against his left was the last
contingency that he anticipated; and had the Confederates moved as
Lee intended, there can be no question but that the Federal army,
deprived of all supplies, cut off from Washington, and forced to
fight on ground where it was unprepared, would have been disastrously
defeated.
But it was not to be. The design was thwarted by one of those petty
accidents which play so large a part in war. Stuart had been
instructed to lead the advance. The only brigade at his disposal had
not yet come up into line, but a message had been sent to appoint a
rendezvous, and it was expected to reach Verdiersville, five miles
from Raccoon Ford, on the night of the 17th. Stuart's message,
however, was not sufficiently explicit. Nothing was said of the
exigencies of the situation; and the brigadier, General Fitzhugh Lee,
not realising the importance of reaching Verdiersville on the 17th,
marched by a circuitous route in order to replenish his supplies. At
nightfall he was still absent, and the omission of a few words in a
simple order cost the Confederates dear. Moreover, Stuart himself,
who had ridden to Verdiersville with a small escort, narrowly escaped
capture. His plumed hat, with which the whole army was familiar, as
well as his adjutant-general and his dispatch-box, fell into the
hands of a Federal reconnoitring party; and among the papers brought
to Pope was found a letter from General Lee, disclosing the fact that
Jackson had been strongly reinforced.
In consequence of the absence of Fitzhugh Lee's brigade, the movement
was postponed until the morning of the 20th. The Commander-in-Chief
was of opinion that the horses, exhausted by their long march, would
require some rest before they were fit for the hard work he proposed
for them. Jackson,
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