for once in opposition, urged that the movement
should go forward. His signal officer on Clark's Mountain reported
that the enemy was quiet, and even extending his right up stream. The
location of the Federal divisions had been already ascertained. The
cavalry was not required to get information. There was no need,
therefore, to wait till Fitzhugh Lee's brigade was fit for movement.
Jackson had, with his own command, a sufficient number of squadrons
to protect the front and flanks of the whole army; and the main
object was not to cut the enemy's communications, but to turn his
left and annihilate him. Pope was still isolated, still unconscious
of his danger, and the opportunity might never return.
The suggestion, however, was overruled, and "it was fortunate," says
one of Pope's generals, "that Jackson was not in command of the
Confederates on the night of August 17; for the superior force of the
enemy must have overwhelmed us, if we could not have escaped, and
escape on that night was impossible."* (* General George H. Gordon.
The Army of Virginia page 9.)
It is probable, however, that other causes induced General Lee to
hold his hand. There is good reason to believe that it was not only
the cavalry that was unprepared. The movement from Richmond had been
rapid, and both vehicles and supplies had been delayed. Nor were all
the generals so avaricious of time as Jackson. It was impossible, it
was urged, to move without some food in the waggons. Jackson replied
that the enemy had a large magazine at Brandy Station, which might
easily be captured, and that the intervening district promised an
abundance of ripening corn and green apples. It was decided, however,
that such fare, on which, it may be said, the Confederates learned
afterwards to subsist for many days in succession, was too meagre for
the work in hand. Jackson, runs the story, groaned so audibly when
Lee pronounced in favour of postponement, that Longstreet called the
attention of the Commander-in-Chief to his apparent disrespect.
August 18.
Be this as it may, had it been possible to adopt Jackson's advice,
the Federal army would have been caught in the execution of a
difficult manoeuvre. On the morning of the 18th, about the very hour
that the advance should have begun, Pope was informed by a spy that
the Confederate army was assembled behind Clark's Mountain and the
neighbouring hills; that the artillery horses were harnessed, and
that the troops wer
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