3 page 688), that
the report refers to Longstreet's and not Jackson's troops, and was
written on August 28.) Nevertheless, although working in the dark,
the Federal commander, up to the moment he reached Bristoe Station,
had acted with sound judgment. He had inferred from the reports of
his signalmen that Jackson was marching to Front Royal on the
Shenandoah; but in order to clear up the situation, on the 26th Sigel
and McDowell were ordered to force the passage of the Rappahannock at
Waterloo Bridge and the Sulphur Springs, and obtain information of
the enemy's movements. Reno, at the same time, was to cross below the
railway bridge and make for Culpeper. The manoeuvres, however, were
not carried out as contemplated. Only McDowell advanced; and as Lee
had replaced Longstreet, who marched to Orleans the same afternoon,
by Anderson, but little was discovered.
(MAP OF THE SITUATION AT SUNSET, AUGUST 27th, 1862.)
It was evident, however, that the Confederates were trending steadily
northwards, and on the night of the 26th Pope ordered his 80,000
Federals to concentrate in the neighbourhood of Warrenton. Reports
had come in that hostile troops had passed through Salem, White
Plains, and Thoroughfare Gap.* (* O.R. volume 12 part 3 page 672.
Pope to Porter page 675. Pope to Halleck page 684.) But it seemed
improbable, both to Pope and McDowell, the second in command, that
more was meant by this than a flank attack on Warrenton. McDowell
expressed his opinion that a movement round the right wing in the
direction of Alexandria was far too hazardous for the enemy to
attempt. Pope appears to have acquiesced, and a line of battle near
Warrenton, with a strong reserve at Greenwich, to the right rear, was
then decided on. Franklin's army corps from the Peninsula, instead of
proceeding to Aquia Creek, was disembarking at Alexandria, and
Halleck had been requested to push these 10,000 men forward with all
speed to Gainesville. The Kanawha regiments had also reached
Washington, and Pope was under the impression that these too would be
sent to join him. He had therefore but little apprehension for his
rear. The one error of judgment into which both Pope and McDowell had
been betrayed was in not giving Lee due credit for audacity or
Jackson for energy. That Lee would dare to divide his army they had
never conceived; that Jackson would march fifty miles in two days and
place his single corps astride their communications was an idea w
|