y in imposing masses. Shortly after seven
o'clock, hidden to some extent by the woods, four divisions of
infantry deployed in several lines at the foot of the Henry Hill, and
their skirmishers became engaged with the Confederate pickets. At the
same moment three batteries came into action on a rise north-east of
Groveton, opposite the Confederate centre, and Sigel, supported by
Reynolds, prepared to carry out his instructions, and hold Jackson
until the remainder of Pope's army should arrive upon the field. At
the end of July, Sigel's army corps had numbered 13,000 men. Allowing
for stragglers and for casualties on the Rappahannock, where it had
been several times engaged, it must still have mustered 11,000. It
was accompanied by ten batteries, and Reynolds' division was composed
of 8000 infantry and four batteries. The attack was thus no stronger
than the defence, and as the Federal artillery positions were
restricted by the woods, there could be little doubt of the result.
In other respects, moreover, the combatants were not evenly matched.
Reynolds' Pennsylvanians were fine troops, already seasoned in the
battles on the Peninsula, and commanded by such officers as Meade and
Seymour. But Sigel, who had been an officer in the Baden army, had
succeeded Fremont, and his corps was composed of those same Germans
whom Ewell had used so hardly at Cross Keys. Many of them were old
soldiers, who had borne arms in Europe; but the stern discipline and
trained officers of conscript armies were lacking in America, and the
Confederate volunteers had little respect for these foreign levies.
Nor were Sigel's dispositions a brilliant example of offensive
tactics. His three divisions, Schurz', Schenck's, and Steinwehr's,
supported by Milroy's independent brigade, advanced to the attack
along a wide front. Schurz, with two brigades, moving into the
Groveton wood, assailed the Confederate left, while Milroy and
Schenck advanced over the open meadows which lay in front of the
right. Steinwehr was in reserve, and Reynolds, somewhat to the rear,
moved forward on the extreme left. The line was more than two miles
long; the artillery, hampered by the ground, could render but small
assistance; and at no single point were the troops disposed in
sufficient depth to break through the front of the defence. The
attack, too, was piecemeal. Advancing through the wood, Schurz'
division was at once met by a sharp counterstroke, delivered by the
left br